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Laos´s Peripheral Centrality in Southeast Asia: Mobility, Labour and Regional Integration 
Abstract 
Laos´s position at the centre of the Southeast Asian mainland has entailed peripherality to 
regional loci of power. Its geography of peripheral centrality has however resulted in Laos 
becoming a realm of contestation between powerful neighbours. The analysis traces the 
construction of Laos within a regional space from pre-colonial times to contemporary special 
economic zones. Laos has been produced through mobility, foreign actors´ attempts to reorient 
space to their sphere of influence, and transnational class relations incorporating Lao workers 
and peasants, Lao elites and foreign powers. These elements manifest within current special 
economic zone projects.   
Key words: Laos, regional integration, mobility, labour, special economic zones. 
Introduction 
In the past two decades, the Lao government has emphasized turning Laos from a “land-
locked” to a “land-linked” country. Laos is located at the centre of mainland Southeast Asia and 
has been historically isolated from maritime trade routes. The vision encapsulated by the “land-
linked” phrase is thus of transforming Laos´s relative geographic isolation into a centre of 
connectivity for the region. Laos will act as the central integrative territory which brings together 
other countries in the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS), facilitating commerce between them.1 
The “land-locked” part of the phrase implies tropes of “Laos as a forgotten, lost, half-formed 
and remote land”,2 one which has historically experienced “political, territorial and military 
stagnation”.3 The move to a “land-linked” country can therefore be read as signifying a desire to 
                                                          
1 Vatthana Pholsena and Ruth Banomyong, Laos From Buffer State to Crossroads (Chiang Mai: Mekong 
Press, 2006), 2-3. 
2 Jonathan Rigg, Living with Transition in Laos: Market Integration in Southeast Asia (London; New York: 
Routledge, 2005), 46. 
3 Vatthana Pholsena and Ruth Banomyong, Laos From Buffer State to Crossroads, 2. 
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emerge from the traditional and autarkic into the bustling modernity of Southeast Asian 
capitalism. The straightforward linearity of this discursive manoeuvre obscures however the 
long and diverse history of Laos´s integration with the region. Rather than viewing Laos as largely 
apart from the main sweep of continental Southeast Asian history, it appears to make more 
sense to highlight the multiple forms of integration Laos has experienced, and their continuities 
and ruptures. Identifying the long trajectory of Laos within the region will then provide a vantage 
point for understanding the current round of regional integration.   
The aim here is threefold. The first is to disrupt a straightforward notion of peripheries 
and centres in Laos´s external relations and integration into the global capitalist system. Laos 
has been cast as the “edge of the world”4 or a “colonial backwater”.5 This however downplays 
the importance it has had as a constitutive part of historical regional dynamics and neighbouring 
polities. This is not to flip its peripherality to an all-important determining role, and ascribe a 
significance that would be difficult to maintain. It is rather to highlight that Lao territories have 
often been an object of contest through the history of capitalist development, spatial integration 
and colonial expansion in Southeast Asia. A focus on Laos´s role thus sheds light on the historical 
geography of capitalist trajectories in the region. The second aim is to establish that efforts to 
orient Laos to a sphere of influence or particular spatial formation, such as colonial Indochina, 
have involved Lao actors pursuing their own aims and goals when engaging with external 
powers. This complicates any easy narrative of imposition of external power or dependency. The 
third aim relates closely to the second, to emphasize the agency of a particular category of Lao 
actor; the subaltern. Unlike the majority of Lao historiography which tends to emphasize the 
historical agency of elite Lao, I highlight the relevance of worker and peasant agency to Laos´s 
shifting orientations within the region. I situate this subaltern agency in relation to both Lao and 
                                                          
4 Jonathan Rigg, “Land-locked Laos: Development Dilemmas at the Edge of the World,” Geopolitics and 
International Boundaries 2, 1 (1997): 153-174. 
5 Geoffrey Gunn, Rebellion in Laos: Peasant and Politics in a Colonial Backwater (Boulder; Oxford: 
Westview Press, 1990) 
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foreign elite actors. Two important and interrelated themes are thus opened up; class relations 
and mobility. The aim here is to establish “an analytical optic that thinks core-periphery relations 
and class relations as coeval and intermeshed forces in capitalist development”.6 Laos´s various 
forms of integration have been processed through class relations both internal to the territory 
and stretching beyond it, and these class relations in turn have often hinged upon the spatial 
mobility of the subaltern. Capture and flight of labour power has been a persistent theme. This 
is evident not only for ethnic Lao-Tai,7 but also for ethnic minorities, Vietnamese, and latterly 
Chinese migrants who have crisscrossed Lao space. This historical perspective helps us better 
understand two key points of contemporary relevance: struggles over mobility of the subaltern 
partly determine the forms of integration and the winners and losers therein; and analysis of 
development in Laos must be undertaken by situating it firmly within its regional connections in 
order to be adequate in explanation.  
Peripheries, Centres and the Labour in Between 
Analysis in terms of centres, or cores, and peripheries has been an abiding perspective 
on capitalist development, but is rightly viewed as problematic. While taking into account that 
vast economic and political inequalities exist between territories, a binary model is too blunt for 
the analysis of complex connections.  Frank famously asserted a core-periphery model for the 
structure of the global economy, established in the colonial era.8  Frank thus rejects the linear 
model of modernization theory, which sees only internal limitations on a country´s capacity for 
development, to posit instead a stunted developmental pathway for the unfortunate peripheral 
countries, structurally determined by global trading relations with the core. He analyses the 
                                                          
6 Alf Gunvald Nilsen, “Passages from Marxism to Postcolonialism: A Comment on Vivek Chibber´s 
Postcolonial Theory and the Specter of Capital,” Critical Sociology 43, 4-5 (2017): 559-571, p.560.  
7 “Lao-Tai” refers to the majority ethnic group in Laos, who are part of the broader Tai ethno-linguistic 
group, which also includes the Thai of Thailand. 
8 Andre Gunder Frank, “The Development of Underdevelopment,” Monthly Review 18, 4 (1966): 17-31; 
see also Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the 




“development of under-development” as enacted through a satellite model which reaches deep 
into peripheral countries, sucking surplus value to the metropolitan cores. The value of Frank´s 
contribution lies in directing attention to the global inequalities of power which impact societal 
development. Nevertheless, Brenner was to emphatically critique Frank´s perspective for eliding 
the centrality of class relations in production.9 More sophisticated versions of structural core-
periphery analysis however aimed to understand “the dialectic of internal and external factors 
and social relations which conditioned development”.10 Contemporary global development is 
still interpreted by some authors in terms of the core-periphery structures, with endogenous 
technological development in core countries essentially unconnected with broader international 
conditions and diffusing out from the core.11  
Anievas and Nisancioglu have taken issue with such internalist thinking on the grounds 
that international conditions have shaped developmental trajectories of what have been 
deemed to be “core” countries, a perspective which provides a useful approach for the present 
argument. Anievas and Nisancioglu mobilize Trotsky´s concept of uneven and combined 
development to emphasize “the geopolitically interconnected and sociologically co-constitutive 
nature of [capitalism´s] emergence”.12 Unevenness refers to the differentiated level and 
conditions of development both within and between countries, and the attendant spatial 
differences, entailing that structural competitive pressures between societies create “the whip 
of external necessity” which influence development. “Social development is thus ineluctably 
                                                          
9 Robert Brenner, “The Origins of Capitalist Development: A Critique of Neo-Smithian Marxism,” New 
Left Review I/104 (1977): 25-92. 
10 Andrew M. Fischer, “The End of Peripheries? On the Enduring Relevance of Structuralism for 
Understanding Contemporary Global Development,” Development and Change 46, 4 (2015): 700-732, 
p.708. 
11 Andrew M. Fischer, “The End of Peripheries? On the Enduring Relevance of Structuralism for 
Understanding Contemporary Global Development” 
12 Alexander Anievas and Kerem Nisancioglu, “What´s at Stake in the Transition Debate? Rethinking the 
Origins of Capitalism and the `Rise of the West´”, Millennium 42, 1 (2013): 78-102, p.85. 
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multilinear, polycentric and co-constitutive by virtue of its interconnectedness”.13 Combination 
describes the determination of the internal relations of a given society by their relations with 
developmentally differentiated societies, but also the way that different developmental stages 
are amalgamated within societies, giving rise to social forms which weld together contemporary 
and more archaic elements to create “multilinear trajectories of development”.14 The concept 
of uneven and combined development thus allows us to specify the co-constitution and thus co-
dependence of core and peripheral societies. It permits insight into the highly specific 
conjunctural integration of centre and periphery in determinate historical and geographical 
contexts, acting as an explanatory factor for outcomes. This allows us to go past simple 
diffusionist models or a model such as Frank´s in which development is essentially determined 
by the needs of a metropolitan centre.15  
In uneven and combined development the central concept is mode of production. The 
work of Jairus Banaji offers a way to view modes of production in a complex and non-linear way 
which avoids reducing them to a form of labour exploitation.16 This enables analysis of multiple 
forms of labour exploitation as contributing to the development of capitalism. Banaji criticizes 
Marxist theory which employs a method of “formal abstractionism” in which “modes of 
production” are “deducible, by a relation of virtual identity, from the given forms of exploitation 
of labour”.17 The mode of production is rather given by “the laws of motion” specific to a 
historical epoch, and which are found in the capitalist mode of production as “the production 
and accumulation of surplus-value, the revolutionization of the labour process, the production 
of relative surplus-value on the basis of a capitalistically constituted labour-process, the 
                                                          
13 Alexander Anievas and Kerem Nisancioglu, “What´s at Stake in the Transition Debate? Rethinking the 
Origins of Capitalism and the `Rise of the West´”, 86. 
14 Alexander Anievas and Kerem Nisancioglu, “What´s at Stake in the Transition Debate? Rethinking the 
Origins of Capitalism and the `Rise of the West´” 86. 
15 Jairus Banaji, Theory as History: Essays on Modes of Production and Exploitation, (Chicago: Haymarket 
Books, 2011), 65. 
16 This follows the argument of Alf Gunvald Nilsen, “Passages from Marxism to Postcolonialism: A 
Comment on Vivek Chibber´s Postcolonial Theory and the Specter of Capital”. 
17 Jairus Banaji, Theory as History, 53. 
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compulsion to increase the productivity of labour, etc.”, that is from the “economic rhythms”.18 
These economic rhythms may be manifested through various forms of labour subjection 
entailing that “the deployment of labour is correlated with modes of production in complex 
ways”.19 Federici similarly emphasizes the importance of the “accumulation of labour” in 
multiple forms in both colonized peripheral and core countries.20 Historical and contemporary 
capitalism has thus been constituted by labour deployment which is not only based on “free” 
wage-labour or wage labour clearly identifiable as being in a wage labour relationship, but which 
also incorporates various forms that can be characterized as “bonded labour”,21 “unfree 
labour”22 or “disguised wage labour”.23  Banaji´s approach thus allows us to identify the 
emergence of capitalism and the integration of peripheral territories into a capitalist system as 
a long-term historical process which is non-linear and non-stadial “in which different forms of 
labour control are fused together across transnational space in specific configurations at 
particular conjunctures”.24 Labour in peripheral countries is incorporated into a developing 
transnational nexus of capitalist relations in highly complex ways. The development of uneven 
and combined capitalism – and so centre-periphery relations - is manifested through varied 
labour and class relations specific to particular historical-geographical conjunctures, relations 
that are ineluctably local but also stretch beyond that locality. Attempts to integrate Laos into 
Southeast Asia over the past two centuries will illustrate these points. 
Laos: Region and Mobility 
                                                          
18 Jairus Banaji, Theory as History, 60. 
19 Jairus Banaji, Theory as History, 5. 
20 Silvia Federici, Caliban and the Witch: Women, the Body and Primitive Accumulation, (New York: 
Autonomedia, 2004). 
21 Sabine Damir-Geilsdorf, Ulrike Lindner, Oliver Tappe, and Michael Zeuske eds. Bonded Labour: Global 
and Comparative Perspectives (18th-21st Century), (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2016). 
22 Tom Brass, “Debating Capitalist Dynamics and Unfree Labour: A Missing Link?,” Journal of 
Development Studies 50, 4 (2014): 570-582; cf. Jairus Banaji, Theory as History, 131-154. 
23 Barbara Harriss-White, “Labour and Petty Production,” Development and Change 45, 5 (2014): 981-
1000.  
24 Alf Gunvald Nilsen, “Passages from Marxism to Postcolonialism: A Comment on Vivek Chibber´s 
Postcolonial Theory and the Specter of Capital,” 568.  
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I suggest here that the key to understanding Laos´s trajectories of capitalist 
development is to focus on the ways it lies at the centre of the Southeast Asian landmass and 
political and economic actors around it have attempted to orientate it to their sphere of 
influence and so create a specific regional configuration. In the pre-colonial era, Siam 
dominated, while French colonialists subsequently attempted to establish a distinct Indochinese 
space. Recent regional integration projects represent a more polycentric configuration, in which 
Laos has become an arena for the contending interests of Chinese, Thai and Vietnamese capital 
and states.   Integration has in turn depended on establishing specific sets of class relations 
which link the ruling classes of imperial or capitalist “centres” with local Lao elites and with local 
subaltern classes. Siamese nobility mobilized Lao slave and feudal corvée labour; French 
colonialists in cooperation with Lao lords raised corvée and imported Vietnamese wage labour; 
contemporary foreign investors have engaged Lao workers in class relations mediated through 
the Lao state. In Laos such class relations have been heavily conditioned by the subaltern classes´ 
mobility and ruling classes´ attempts to manipulate mobility to essentially capture and fix 
workers and peasants in place.25 Indicated here is the importance Moulier-Boutang attributes 
to flight of labour - which I would expand to mobility more broadly – as an active driver of 
change, one in which “those who do not have power are not necessarily exterior to the 
determination of power; they manage to modify it profoundly.”26 This point can be usefully 
borne in mind in the following examination of Laos´s longue durée of capitalist integration. To 
be clear, the argument here is not that a capitalist mode of production has existed in Laos since 
the late 18th century nor that Laos was predominantly and uninterruptedly capitalist from when 
capitalist production was first demonstrably established, arguably under the French; the early 
socialist plan years of the Lao PDR, for instance, are clear evidence it was not. It is rather that 
                                                          
25 For an argument on the capture of subaltern labour power more generally in Southeast Asia see 
James C. Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Southeast Asia, (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2009).  
26 Stany Grelet, “The Art of Flight: An Interview with Yann Moulier-Boutang,” Rethinking Marxism 13, 3-4 
(2001): 227-235, p.228. 
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capitalist social relations have incorporated Lao people and territory for a longer period of time 
than is often thought and that mobile, transnational class relations have been key for each of 
the periods of uneven and combined regional integration discussed.  The history is one of 
rupture and unevenness, but also of continuities in mobility in the constitution of Laos´s 
territory. Molland points out that “sedentariness” is typical of portrayals of Laos but is correct 
to assert that it is historically more accurate to assess Laos as gaining form through “polycentric 
connections” of trading and population movements in the Upper Mekong region.27 The 
centrality of mobile class relations in these “polycentric connections” is thus explored below. 
Pre-colonial Integration with Siam 
Control over the mobility and labour power of Lao populations was significant in the late 
18th and early 19th centuries, as the early Bangkok kings of Siam attempted to establish regional 
hegemony. The renewal of Siam, after the Burmese sacking of the old Siamese capital, Ayudhya, 
in 1767, was enacted through an emergent commercial capitalism centred on Bangkok, and 
concomitant military action to assert control over peripheral resources to supply that trade. 
“Political expansionism thus resulted directly from the rejuvenation of the economy after the 
sacking of Ayudhya”.28 Economic growth was driven by Chinese demand and trading networks, 
while at the beginning of the 19th century the expansion of British influence in Southeast Asia 
created additional trading possibilities.29 The Siamese ruling class obtained from Laos and other 
peripheries highly-valued forest produce to provide the Chinese merchants increasingly 
established in Bangkok from the late 18th century.30  The expansion of this trade spurred 
                                                          
27 Sverre Molland, “Migration and Mobility in Laos,” in Changing Lives in Laos: Society, Politics, and 
Culture in a Post-Socialist State, ed. Vanina Bouté and Vatthana Pholsena (Singapore: NUS Press, 2017), 
327-349, pp. 327-328. 
28 Mayoury Ngaosyvathn and Pheuiphanh Ngaosyvathn, Paths to Conflagration: Fifty Years of Diplomacy 
and Warfare in Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam, 1778-1828, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Southeast Asia Program 
Publications), 37. 
29 Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, Thailand: Economy and Politics, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002), 13, 101; Mayoury Ngaosyvathn and Pheuiphanh Ngaosyvathn, Paths to Conflagration, 46. 
30 Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, Thailand: Economy and Politics, 13; Suehiro Akira, Capital 
Accumulation in Thailand 1855-1985, (Chiang Mai: Silkworm, 1996), 17. 
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commodification of production and was linked to new productive ventures in the central region 
of Siam and the hinterland. From the 1820s onwards, tax farming concessions given to Chinese 
immigrant “primitive entrepreneurs” by the Siamese government promoted investment and 
production of the concession goods for local consumption and export.31 Tax farmers “were able 
to expand their trade business by using the large profits accruing from this lucrative official 
business.”32 By the end of the 19th century, Chinese profits and Crown revenues from tax farming 
were being redeployed in the growing Bangkok urban economy and forming the basis of 
prominent business families as well as positioning the royals within the Thai capitalist class.33 
The issue of significance here is that the establishment in Siam of a specifically capitalist mode 
of production – following Banaji´s emphasis on the economic rhythms of surplus value 
production and accumulation – found its roots in the commercial and productive expansion of 
the Bangkok revival. The role of labour mobilization was key within this.  
The incorporation of Lao labour into Siamese capitalist orbits was undertaken through 
such means as the resettlement and enslavement of war captives, and tattooing to indicate 
corvée labour obligations to the Siamese crown or nobility. Historically, low population densities 
in mainland Southeast Asia had led to polities´ competition over populations and their forced 
removal to another territory to satisfy labour demands.34 The early Bangkok rulers implemented 
a vigorous programme of asserting control over labour, including improving the registration of 
phrai – free commoners who were required to submit labour services to feudal lords – and 
tattooing their wrists to enable identification and control.35 Siam´s mobilization of labour within 
its territories was pivotal for providing the military manpower to effectively subjugate Laos and 
Cambodia into tributary status. Military campaigns asserted Siamese power and provided 
                                                          
31 Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, Thailand: Economy and Politics, 100. 
32 Suehiro Akira, Capital Accumulation in Thailand 1855-1985, 73. 
33 Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, Thailand: Economy and Politics, 107. 
34 Anthony Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 1450-1680: Volume 1, (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1988), 132-135.  
35 Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, Thailand: Economy and Politics, 12. 
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security for the Siamese state but were also accompanied by the forced transfer of Lao 
populations, as “there was work to be done in Siam, but not enough people to do it”.36 In 1779 
when the Siamese defeated the Lao principality of Vientiane, thousands of Lao families were 
subsequently made to resettle in central Siam, and worked on the estates of the nobility there.37 
The supply in slave labour helped to boost the early accumulation of capital, contributing to a 
move away from petty production and into export commodities.38 For example, new sugar 
cultivation methods used between the 1810s and 1860s were labour-intensive, with sugar 
workers “often procured through duress”.39 Chinese immigrant merchants initiated sugar 
processing from sugar cane around 1810. Immigrant Chinese labour was used in this industry 
but was apparently insufficient to meet the growing world demand for Siamese sugar exports, 
and forced migrants were employed in expanding the agricultural production to feed the sugar 
factories staffed by Chinese wage labour.40 Lao war captives were resettled in villages in the 
vicinity of Bangkok, and these villages retained their slave status into the late 19th century, when, 
freed from their bonded obligations, they found waged employment in government public 
works, and Western and Chinese industrial enterprises.41 
5000 Lao were raided from Vientiane in the 1780s to provide construction labour.42 
Slave labour was used in Siam for constructing canals, roads, and irrigation works for agriculture 
as well as other public works such as fortifications.43 The forced mobility of Lao populations into 
Siamese territory thus also contributed to the infrastructural developments which facilitated the 
                                                          
36 Mayoury Ngaosyvathn and Pheuiphanh Ngaosyvathn, Paths to Conflagration, 46. 
37 Martin Stuart-Fox, The Lao Kingdom of Lan Xang: Rise and Decline, (Bangkok: White Lotus, 1998), 112. 
38 Mayoury Ngaosyvathn and Pheuiphanh Ngaosyvathn, Paths to Conflagration, 45. 
39 Mayoury Ngaosyvathn and Pheuiphanh Ngaosyvathn, Paths to Conflagration, 46. 
40 Puangthong R. Pawakapan, “Warfare and Depopulation of the Trans-Mekong Basin and the Revival of 
Siam´s Economy,” Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, no.15 (Hong Kong: City 
University of Hong Kong, 2014), 17-18; Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, Thailand: Economy and 
Politics, 188. 
41 Edward Van Roy, “Under Duress: Lao War Captives at Bangkok in the Nineteenth Century,” Journal of 
the Siam Society 97 (2009): 43-68. 
42 Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, Thailand: Economy and Politics, 13. 
43 Andrew Turton, “Thai Institutions of Slavery,” in Asian and African Systems of Slavery, ed. James L. 
Watson, (Berkeley; Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1980), 251-292.  
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mobility of goods and people throughout the kingdom, strengthening connections with 
developing transnational capitalist circuits. 
Lao corvée labour services also contributed to the manpower required for economic 
expansion. Siamese administrations tattooed commoners on the wrist to register their status as 
phrai.44 Early in the reign of Rama III (r.1824-1851) the Siamese administration conducted 
tattooing of Lao meuang45 on the west bank of the Mekong to consolidate territorial and 
population control. The commoners of the Lao meuang had never before been subjected to this 
form of labour control. Lao corvée labour was raised in this period to construct public works for 
the new capital of Bangkok, including a fortress.46 These labour demands “thus made on Lao 
peasants who had never previously had to perform such heavy, prolonged labour caused 
considerable dissatisfaction, and undoubtedly contributed to growing Lao resentment”.47 The 
recalcitrant position of the requisitioned Lao peasants here indicates an important role of the 
subaltern in causing events of historical significance. 
The discontent caused by labour requisitions contributed to causing a Lao uprising in the 
1820s which would ultimately end in defeat and the forcible transfer of a large part of the Lao 
population to Siamese territory. The lord of Vientiane, Chao Anouvong, for reasons of which the 
issue of control over Lao manpower was but one and which need not detain us here, launched 
a revolt against the Siamese suzerain in 1827. A priority for Anouvong was to regain control over 
all the Lao on the Khorat plateau48 under Siamese rule in order to boost the population – and 
thus military and labour – resources available to him.49 When the Siamese defeated the revolt 
                                                          
44 Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, Thailand: Economy and Politics, 8; B.J. Terwiel, “Tattooing in 
Thailand´s History,” Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society 111, 2 (1979), 156-166. 
45 Meuang were the historical Tai polities, typically centred on a key population locus. The contemporary 
Thai and Lao word is used for both “city” and “country” (e.g. Thailand).  
46 Mayoury Ngaosyvathn and Pheuiphanh Ngaosyvathn, Paths to Conflagration, 141-145; Martin Stuart-
Fox, The Lao Kingdom of Lan Xang, 119. 
47 Martin Stuart-Fox, The Lao Kingdom of Lan Xang, 119. 
48 Northeast Thailand. 
49 Martin Stuart-Fox, The Lao Kingdom of Lan Xang, 119. 
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they sacked Vientiane, and “tens of thousands of families” were forcibly resettled in areas under 
firm Siamese control, with many relocated to the Chao Phraya Basin.50  The assertion of Siamese 
control over the Lao territories brought them more directly into conflict with an expansionary 
Vietnam. The Vietnamese presented a challenge to control over the labour resources in the area 
of the Mekong.51 The population on the Siamese-Vietnamese frontier also represented a 
security threat for Bangkok, as potential supporters of a Vietnamese invasion. Siam thus 
undertook measures to depopulate the east bank of the Mekong, combining tactics of force and 
persuasion. Depopulation efforts continued into the 1840s, with struggle over the mobility of 
populations evident: “Those resettled took any opportunity to return, despite continuing 
Siamese raids”; nevertheless, by 1847 “the east bank was a virtual wasteland of abandoned 
villages and rice fields”.52 The depopulation of the territory would impact on later French 
attempts to conjoin their new colony with Indochina, as detailed below.  
Labour from Laos was also implicated in the development of the late 19th-century 
Siamese economy through economic migration for waged employment, foreshadowing the 
migration flows of the contemporary era. British companies extracted teak for export in the hills 
of what is now northern Thailand. Teak extraction necessitated a large labour force to live in the 
forests. Lowland Thai rice farmers were unwilling to do such work and large numbers of ethnic 
Khamu from Laos were hired for fixed wages for set periods of time. They were attracted 
through cash payments with which they could buy goods to take home to isolated home villages. 
Migrating for wage employment in Thailand however also became a means to avoid onerous 
French corvée and tax requirements.53  
                                                          
50 Martin Stuart-Fox, The Lao Kingdom of Lan Xang, 125. 
51 Puangthong R. Pawakapan, “Warfare and Depopulation of the Trans-Mekong Basin and the Revival of 
Siam´s Economy”, 14. 
52 Martin Stuart-Fox, The Lao Kingdom of Lan Xang, 131. 
53 Kennon Breazeale, “Historical Population Movements in North and Northeast Thailand,” Journal of 
Population and Social Studies 20, 2 (2012): 109-144. 
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Emergent Siamese capitalism gained impetus from Chinese trade and the challenge of British 
imperial influence but also from consolidation of control over peripheral labour and resources. 
Bonded corvée, slave labour and wage labour all came from the Lao territories to variously 
produce export commodities and create the necessary infrastructure for capitalist expansion. 
The development of capitalism within Lao territories themselves may have been lacking, but the 
uneven development between Siam and Laos was constituted via the at times highly adverse 
incorporation of Lao labour under multiple modes of deployment.  
Labour, Mobility and Class Relations in French Laos 
The expansion of French colonialism into Laos from an initial base in Cochinchina was 
motivated by both capitalist interests and inter-colonialist competition with Britain.54 Laos was 
to play a small yet still important role in the French colonial project in Indochina, which was 
focused on Vietnam. The French were spurred to expand out of their Vietnamese base to on the 
one hand reinvigorate the French economy at the end of the 1870s, and on the other to halt any 
possible British expansion eastwards.55 The French also initially had a view to use Laos as a 
staging ground for expansion into Siam west of the Mekong.56 The French held Indochina to be 
a single entity composed of five parts; the Vietnamese territories of Tonkin, Annam and 
Cochinchina, and also Laos and Cambodia. The colonists did not consider the Lao east bank 
territories to be a separate and coherent political entity but rather an extension of Vietnamese 
Indochina. It was a strategic hinterland which would consolidate the Vietnamese-centred 
Indochinese space geopolitically and through its natural resources economically.57 Indochina 
                                                          
54 Pierre Brocheux and Daniel Hémery, Indochina: An Ambiguous Colonization, 1858-1954, (Berkeley; Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 2009), 32-39.  
55 Søren Ivarsson, Creating Laos: The Making of a Lao Space between Indochina and Siam, 1860-1945, 
(Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2008), 33. 
56 Martin Stuart-Fox, A History of Laos, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 23. 
57 Martin Stuart-Fox, “The French in Laos, 1887-1945,” Modern Asian Studies 29, 1 (1995): 111-139. 
15 
 
was thus constituted through its Lao periphery, as Siam had constituted itself through control 
over its Lao margins earlier in the century. 
Colonial policy in Laos was directed at ways it could serve the Vietnamese colonies. 
France however intended that the Lao colony pay for itself. The French initially had high hopes 
for Laos as a conduit to Chinese trade, but the Mekong could not provide a route to China.58 
Hopes of intra-Indochinese trade were also dampened when it became apparent that trade both 
in Laos and in the Khorat plateau was oriented towards Bangkok.59 Efforts to promote economic 
development instead centred on repopulating Laos with a workforce and constructing a 
transport infrastructure. Establishing control over labour and thus restructuring class relations 
between a colonial French state, Indochinese elites and Lao and Vietnamese labour were central 
in these tasks. 
Capitalist development in colonial Laos implied a spatial reconstruction which 
attempted to weld the territory to the Vietnamese colonies, as a provider of commodities 
extracted using French capital and as a vent for Vietnamese surplus labour.60 Tin-mining was the 
main focus of capitalist investment in the Lao economy. Export-oriented rubber and coffee 
plantations also existed to a smaller extent. The debloquement – unblocking or opening up - and 
Laos´s integration into the wider Indochinese economic space assumed a key role in France´s 
mise en valeur of this hinterland. An emphasis on the construction of transport infrastructure 
was such that Gunn argues “the “development” of the country was almost coterminous with 
road construction”.61 Rail and road links were intended to reorient Laos away from its links with 
Siam. Three road routes were built to link the Lao Mekong towns with the Vietnamese coast 
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across the Say Phu Luang cordillera, crossing the range in Thakhaek, Savannakhet and Xieng 
Khouang provinces, although a planned railway never materialized.62  
 The French were faced with significant issues of labour mobilization in their attempts to 
integrate Laos into the circuits of the Indochinese and world economies. They attempted to 
solve this problem through two primary means: importing labour from Vietnam and 
requisitioning corvée labour from the indigenous population. Laos was beset by the issue of low 
population density, a legacy of the Siamese depopulation campaigns. Population was also 
reduced throughout the 19th century by slave raiding in the Lao highlands, stimulated by the 
labour demands of the Siamese economy.63 Laos´s regional integration was once again to be 
defined by significant labour mobility, recursively determined by previous population 
movements.  
In addition to a low population, in the French view the Lao were indolent and lacked the 
vigour needed for development. An important part of the solution was to import more energetic 
Vietnamese surplus labour, especially from Annam, to repopulate the colony.64  Migration to 
Laos was spurred by the dynamics of changing land holdings and class formation in the 
Vietnamese countryside. Wealthy Vietnamese landholders emerged, collaborating with the 
French to gain control over land. Landless and land-poor households increased, forming a 
segment dependent on wage labour or tenant farming arrangements for subsistence.65 
Landlessness and tenancy-related indebtedness thus created pressures for poorer Vietnamese 
to seek work in the capitalist colonial economy in wider Indochina, including Laos. 
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 Vietnamese performed varied tasks within the Lao economy, working as labourers, 
traders, and government officials.66 The French encouraged immigration to the extent that the 
Vietnamese population numbered 40,000 in 1943 and formed majorities in the main Mekong 
valley towns.67 Significant numbers – up to 6,000 – worked in the tin mines of central Laos. Gunn 
notes that Vietnamese migrant labour in Laos was “free” wage labour.68 Mining in central Laos 
appeared to have a fluctuating workforce of seasonal migrant labour, with workers returning 
home in the dry season.69 Conditions were reportedly terrible and the colonial state was 
implicated in coercion of mining labour once within the mining enterprise, indicating the 
confluence of colonial state and capitalist interests.70 Vietnamese labour in Laos was also 
perhaps enmeshed in relations of bondage. The coolie system of indentured71 labour has been 
described as “a crucial factor for French strategies of economic development”.72 Indentured and 
free wage labour were used side by side elsewhere in French Indochina,73 especially on rubber 
plantations, which admittedly Laos largely lacked. It does however raise the possibility that 
indentured labour occurred in Laos.  
 The French also used local corvée labour in their attempts to weld Laos to the 
Indochinese space, with its use mediated through mobility and local class relations. Local labour 
was connected with mobility in two key senses. The first was that corvée was put to work on 
road construction, creating the very conditions for other forms of mobility. The second was that 
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the French faced issues with retaining their workforce as corvée workers resisted through 
mobility. French efforts to impose taxation on the population were enacted through local Lao 
elites, changing in various ways the traditional hierarchical relationships and leading to 
outcomes such as increased mobility and rebellions. 
 The mobilization of Lao corvée workers was interwoven with the taxation system. The 
Lao had to contribute both tax in cash form and prestations (labour dues). Ethnic Lao-Tai males 
aged 19-60 were to pay two piastres a year – compelling participation in the cash economy  by 
for instance selling crops or engaging in wage labour – and were also obligated to perform an 
annual twenty days of corvée, five of which were performed in the taxpayer´s place of origin. 
The required rates for the upland ethnic minorities were set at one piaster and ten days of 
corvée. Prestations were imposed during the less busy period after the harvest season had 
ended. Labourers were put to work on road construction and other public works. As with the 
Siamese deployment of Lao war captives for infrastructure construction, it is notable how unfree 
labour was implicated in the capitalist trajectories of regional integration. In both cases of 
construction requisitioned labour was used not in the direct services of capitalist production but 
in creating a key condition for market integration and commodity circulation. State-sponsored 
corvée also benefited merchant capital in various ways, with trading outposts serviced by 
unremunerated labour requisitions.74  
 The imposition of corvée did not run smoothly and met with various forms of resistance. 
The ethnic Lao-Tai population evidenced highly mobile rejection of labour obligations. According 
to one report of 1930, between 600 and 800 families in the Luang Prabang districts fled to Siam 
to avoid corvée, protesting at both the forced mode of requisition and conditions in the work 
sites.75 Members of the Brao ethnic group moved back and forth across the border between 
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southern Laos and northeastern Cambodia to evade tax and corvée obligations.76 1935 saw the 
mass desertion of three successive shifts of corvée labourers from a public works on the RC13 
highway. Lao-Tai and ethnic minority labourers in Champassak, southern Laos “were notorious 
for late arrival, low productivity, desertions and “arrogance” towards the cai [labour 
supervisor]”.77 As noted above, Khamu from northern Laos were motivated by local corvée to 
migrate to wage employment in northern Thailand. Mobility was thus an important form of 
subaltern agency, representing a form of power; the act or threat of flight could improve 
conditions of life.   
 Local Lao nobility, the chao meuang, had responsibility for collecting taxation and 
deployment of corvée in their areas, as the French had organized their administration to govern 
through the existing social structure.78 In southern Laos local nobility collected the French taxes 
while also demanding traditional taxes and labour levies. The tax burden was thus increased, 
imposing “a considerable and often excessive burden on the poorest levels of society”.79 Local 
differentiation occurred however. In Houaphan, a province then divided between Vietnamese 
and Lao colonial administrations, the stricter combined colonial-feudal requisitions on the 
Vietnamese side caused many peasants to migrate to the Lao side, where local lords had 
calculated the population in a way that allowed them to implement colonial taxes and also take 
their traditional dues without imposing too onerous a burden. The Vietnamese administration 
demanded the return of their taxable population indicating the struggles over a mobile 
population and also over the integration of territory. The migrations were used by French 
colonial administrators as an argument for integrating the Houaphan meuang as a single Lao 
province, achieved in 1903.80  Baird argues that around the turn of the 20th century and in its 
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first decade the revolts launched by Lao upland minorities in southern Laos were motivated in 
part by Siamese and then French colonial disruption of tributary relations with the royal house 
of Champassak, and that furthermore members of the royal house clandestinely participated in 
these revolts.81  
 The French spurred by the external necessity of British competition and need to 
consolidate their Indochinese possessions expanded into Laos and attempted to weld it to the 
more well-developed Vietnamese space to further colonial capitalism. Control over labour was 
crucial in this endeavour, and the methods deployed resonates with Banaji´s arguments on the 
complexity of the articulation of labour deployment with the development of a capitalist mode 
of production. Free wage labour, forced state corvées, and possibly indentured labour were 
implicated in the French mise en valeur. A focus on labour here illustrates how outcomes were 
determined by internal events and processes as well as imposing external forces.  The complex 
arrary of labour mobilities evident across, and crossing, the Lao territories both reflected and 
constituted class relations structured by the colonial state. Tracing these movements evidences 
how Laos was connected to and constitutive of development processes elsewhere in the 
Southeast Asian peninsula, a theme which reoccurs in more recent times.  
Capitalist Development and Lao Mobilities in the Era of ASEAN and the Greater Mekong 
Subregion 
 The 1980s saw Laos embark on a capitalist development pathway after an interregnum 
of some ten years attempting a socialist course. Participation in regional development 
frameworks such as the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Greater Mekong 
Subregion (GMS) increased from the end of the 1990s. Mobilities of the subaltern have 
interacted in complex ways with the advance of capitalist development and regional integration, 
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combining tendencies from the previous two epochs of capitalist development discussed above. 
As in the pre-colonial period, Laos is the source of significant labour migration to Thailand, albeit 
in a typically more voluntary manner. Similar to the French colonial era Laos is also the 
destination for labour migration. Contemporary migration flows come from Vietnam, China and 
also Myanmar. Furthermore, upland ethnic minorities have been drawn more closely into the 
development and geographical mainstream by their often involuntary resettlement and 
sedentarization. The mobilities of workers and peasants have become a target of concern and 
intervention for Lao ruling elites, as they were for the French, as the need to fix a population in 
place for market-oriented production and exchange has gained increasing importance amid the 
possibility that mobility will deprive Laos of the workforce necessary for constituting capitalism 
on its territory.  
Independence for Laos in 1953 initiated a tumultuous 22 year period defined by the 
second Indochina war and a Cold War contest over Laos´s international integration, and resulting 
in Communist revolution in 1975. A firm political relationship with the Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam was established during the war years, but nevertheless the newly minted Lao People´s 
Democratic Republic was affected by two key flows of people west across the Mekong to 
Thailand. Thousands of Lao refugees left the country in the years immediately after the 
revolution, initially largely comprised of those who had served under the defeated Royal Lao 
Government, such as civil servants and members of the royal army.82  The Lao government 
launched a programme of agricultural collectivization in 1978. Many Lao peasants, dissatisfied 
with the reorganization of traditional work patterns, fled across the Mekong. Peasant resistance 
to collectivization, expressed both in situ and through flight to Thailand, undermined the 
programme to such an extent that the government suspended it in 1979.83 The agency of 
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subaltern Lao was here again of significance in influencing changes in the political economy of 
Laos´s regional integration, contributing to an eventual turn to an externally focused orientation.  
The swift abandonment of collectivization is indicative of Laos´s short engagement with 
a socialist planned economy and quick realignment with a capitalist development pathway. In 
1986, after years of economic difficulty, the Lao PDR government embarked on a course of 
market-oriented liberalization. A key strategy was attracting foreign investors, with a raft of 
investment-promoting reforms enacted.84  Foreign investment subsequently increased,85 
picking up especially in the 2000s.86 The major sources of investment have been Laos´s 
immediate neighbours of China, Thailand and Vietnam. Laos´s neighbours vie for economic 
advantage and geopolitical influence, manifesting as investment and aid flows.  Laos can thus 
be seen as a frontier space acting as an expanded arena for the “spatial fixes” of surplus capital 
from its neighbouring countries. For instance, a key motivation of China´s engagement with the 
Greater Mekong Subregion has been the “go out” policy to internationalize regional Chinese 
capital.87 Increases in Vietnamese investment can be seen as part of an intentional Vietnamese 
state strategy to boost Vietnamese capital.88 Thai investments have concentrated in the energy 
sector, with hydropower providing an outlet for Thai capital as well as a benefit in terms of 
energy supply to power the Thai economy.89 This foreign investment has been accompanied and 
facilitated by Laos´s participation in regional integration frameworks. 
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In a manner reminiscent of the French débloquement the Lao government views the 
economic transformation of the country as hinging upon achieving a form of regional 
integration. The current round of regional construction differs in that Laos is integrating with its 
neighbours on all sides.  The government´s discourse of turning Laos from a “land-locked to land-
linked” country signals this intention. Laos officially acceded to ASEAN in 1997, motivated largely 
by an economic interest in gaining access to trade, investment and development aid.90 Laos has 
also participated in the Asian Development Bank-backed Greater Mekong Subregion project 
since its inception in 1992. The GMS, an integration and cooperation framework rather than an 
organization, is based on the idea of a growth triangle; cooperation between neighbouring 
countries at uneven levels of development to not only bolster trade between them but also to 
combine complementary investment and cheap labour in order to boost exports to outside the 
growth triangle.91 A primary aim of the GMS has been to construct “economic corridors”, 
complexes of transport and communications infrastructure which traverse the Southeast Asian 
mainland. Laos is crossed by two of the main corridors, the North South Economic Corridor and 
the East West Economic Corridor (EWEC).92  
 Thailand emerged as a popular destination for Lao labour migration as the Thai economy 
expanded rapidly in the 1980s and 1990s and began to experience labour shortages for its low-
skill industries.93 Lao migrants in Thailand largely work as domestic workers, in agriculture, 
selling food, construction, and light manufacturing. Contemporary Lao labour, as during the pre-
colonial era, has been incorporated into the Thai economy in both free and unfree ways, with 
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trafficking leading to bonded and forced labour.94 It is however clearly not the mass enslavement 
of that period, with workers´ voluntary migration instead capable of turning into unfree 
conditions.95 Exact numbers of Lao migrants in Thailand are hard to ascertain but estimates put 
their number at 306,624 in 2013, rising from 293,519 in 2011.96 The majority go through 
unofficial channels. If numbers have increased in recent years, causes are likely complex with 
demographic changes increasing working age population, pressures on land and livelihoods, 
development of transport infrastructure, and a desire for Thai modernity all implicated.97 Rigg 
warns against economic functionalist explanations of migration,98 although there is evidence of 
migration being spurred by changes in access to land resources due to development projects 
such as hydropower dams.99 Migrants also remain attracted to higher Thai wages and view 
remittances as a key source of income for their families.100 It is thus possible to note that while 
the causes of Lao migration to Thailand are complex, the unequal consequences of Laos´s 
political economy and regional uneven development are important factors. It is noteworthy for 
the perspective developed here that Thailand´s economic trajectory has in a sense become 
dependent on mobilizing labour from its peripheries, including Laos. Thailand has struggled to 
emerge from a low-productivity, low- wage and labour-intensive model of accumulation.101 
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Spatial relocation of industries such as garments to access cheaper migrant labour has 
substituted for value chain upgrading,102 and industries have been sustained by informalized, 
precarious work conditions, including those of migrants.103  
 Migrant Lao labour has helped to sustain a developmental pathway in Thailand which 
does not reflect a linear modernization trajectory, but equally complicates Laos´s own attempts 
to industrialize. The largely foreign-invested garments industry is the most notable labour-
intensive manufacturing sector, centred on Vientiane but also with production in Savannakhet, 
and in existence since the 1990s. With high worker turnover and a tight labour market due to 
out-migration, firm managers have identified labour supply as one of the main constraints on 
their businesses.104 This situation was exacerbated in 2012 with a minimum wage increase in 
Thailand making migration even more attractive, with labour mobility apparently a contributory 
factor to a fall in the value of garments exports from US$ 219 million in 2011 to US$ 174 million 
in 2015.105 Factory owners appear to be in something of an invidious position as while suffering 
labour shortages, the government´s proposed solution of increasing the minimum wage to fix 
workers in Laos or attract them back has been met with scepticism from factory owners also 
concerned about profit margins.106 In this context labour mobilization and securing it in place 
for production assume great significance.  
 It is thus important to note the ways that migrants internal to Laos are incorporated into 
the regional dynamics via foreign investment projects. While many workers are integrated 
through typical wage labour arrangements, there is also evidence of multiple forms of labour 
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extraction, as well as the blurring of the boundaries of “free” and “unfree” labour.107 In Bokeo 
province, northwest Laos, Chinese-invested banana plantations have used migrant workers from 
other provinces as the main crop tenders. Rather than wage labour, they are contracted to be 
paid by a lump sum determined by the weight of bananas harvested from their allocated plot at 
the end of the 7-10 month-long season. Other tasks on the plantations are performed by non-
contracted, largely local day labour working on piece rates.  Although migrants are reported as 
willingly returning for multiple seasons, the contracting method has the practical effect of 
binding them to the plantation for the whole season as they would not receive a final payment 
if they left before it ended. Furthermore, legal access to labour rights was apparently obscured 
by the Chinese companies casting the relationship as one of contract farming, despite contracts 
stipulating Chinese supervision of the labour process.108 On coffee plantations in southern Laos, 
workers have reported receiving partial payments in order to dissuade them from leaving.109 
Recruitment drives in northern villages for Vientiane garments factories also complicate the 
notion of Lao labour´s “free” incorporation into contemporary regional production. Village 
heads have reportedly received per head incentives from factory recruiters to provide them with 
workers, raising the possibility that young women migrate to garment work under pressure from 
powerful community personages.110  
Laos’s integration into the wider regional space has not only been secured through 
migration to Thailand, but also through acting as a vent for neighbouring country surplus labour. 
In-migration also helps to addresses the quandary of labour mobilization in Laos. Foreign 
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investment from China, Vietnam and Thailand has often been accompanied by migrant labour, 
with workers from these countries reported as building projects such as hydropower dams, and 
working in mines and on plantations.111 Burmese migration has also occurred.112 Again much of 
this labour comes through unofficial channels, with some 200,000 undocumented foreign 
workers in Laos in 2012 according to local media.113 As Molland notes “Vietnamese and Chinese 
migration are intimately intertwined with a broader politics of infrastructure development (such 
as road construction), but also land concessions, agribusiness, and…special economic zones”.114   
Chinese migration has been most significant in border provinces in northern Laos. 
Estimates from 2010 put the number of Chinese migrants in Laos at 80,000.115 Chinese workers 
began arriving in the 1990s as part of road construction projects and cooperation between 
Yunnan province and northern Lao provinces. Some of these migrants stayed at the end of their 
contracts to engage in petty trade and business opportunities.116 Most notable recently has been 
the influx of Chinese labour to construct the controversial high-speed railway linking China with 
Vientiane.117 
Vietnamese workers have been reported as working on construction projects in urban 
areas and on plantations,118 and migrating to establish petty businesses.119  Vietnamese migrant 
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numbers have been estimated at 20,000120 although exact figures are hard to ascertain within a 
fluid context of short-term and longer-term migration and ease of crossing the border.121 The 
colonial view of Vietnamese workers as more industrious is mirrored in current day migratory 
flows. Vietnamese rubber companies have been reported preferring to import their compatriots 
for plantation work as they believe that Vietnamese work harder for lower wages.122 Cases have 
been reported of rubber tapping wages dropping in 2013-2014 on Vietnamese-invested 
plantations leading to Lao citizens stopping tapping and seeking wage labour elsewhere, 
including migrating to Thailand. The plantation investors turned to importing Vietnamese labour 
to replace them.123 Thus within a single investment sector is contained multiple strands of Laos´s 
regional interconnectedness, composed by both mobile labour and capital.   
Special Economic Zones 
  The intersections of labour mobility, regional integration and the spatial fixes of capital 
are crystallized in the development of special economic zones in Laos. As sites of foreign 
investment and labour migration which are often placed in border locations to boost 
connectivity with neighbouring countries, they offer a privileged lens for interpreting regional 
integration. Special economic zones can be interpreted as a territorialization project of the Lao 
state which provides the liberalized conditions for foreign investment and capital 
accumulation.124 Zones have also been implicated in a range of state tactics and strategies which 
fix in place population, making people on the one hand legible for state control and on the other 
                                                          
120 Asian Development Bank, Facilitating Safe Labour Migration in the Greater Mekong Subregion; 
Issues, Challenges, and Forward-Looking Interventions, 3 
121 Duong Bich Hanh, “Temporary Lives, Eternal Dreams: Experiences of Viet Labour Migrants in 
Savannakhet, Laos”, 202. 
122 Ian G. Baird, “Turning Land into Capital, Turning People into Labour: Primitive Accumulation and the 
Arrival of Large-Scale Economic Land Concessions in the Lao People´s Democratic Republic,” New 
Proposals: Journal of Marxism and Interdisciplinary Inquiry 5, 1 (2011): 10-26, p.21. 
123 Ian G. Baird and Jefferson Fox, “How Land Concessions Affect Places Elsewhere: Telecoupling, 
Political Ecology, and Large-Scale Plantations in Southern Laos and Northeastern Cambodia,” Land 4, 2 
(2015): 436-453, p.444. 
124 Guillaume Lestrelin, Jean-Christophe Castella and Jeremy Bourgoin, “Territorialising Sustainable 




integrating them into transnational circuits of capital accumulation.  However, the mobility of 
subaltern workers has been shown to both enable and also disrupt the development strategies 
of capital and state.  
 The most notable Lao special economic zones have been the Golden Triangle zone in 
Bokeo province, the Savan-Seno zone in Savannakhet, and the Boten Golden City zone in Luang 
Namtha. The following analysis focuses on the first two of these to highlight contrasting 
intersections of regional integration and labour mobility.125  The Golden Triangle zone is located 
across the border from Thailand in the eponymous tri-border area of Laos, Myanmar and 
Thailand. The Lao government granted a concession to Kings Roman, a Chinese company, in 
2007. The Lao government reports the size of the concession as 3000 hectares, although 
company documents are reported to state that it is 103 km².126 The zone is focused on casino-
based tourism, attracting customers from Thailand and China. The zone both depends on labour 
mobility and has itself been utilized as a tactic to limit mobility. Two thirds of the Golden Triangle 
SEZ consists of hills which will not be developed, instead being turned into a nature reserve 
where swidden agriculture is forbidden.127 This evidences a state tactic used elsewhere in Laos 
of sedentarization of mobile upland populations through land concessions, converting shifting 
cultivation to permanent agriculture.128 The resettlement and sedentarization of upland 
minority populations has been a key state policy to commercialize agriculture and enable service 
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delivery, as well as curtail perceived security threats.129 To develop the Golden Triangle zone 
local Lao people were moved off their land to make way, and received what they deemed to be 
inadequate compensation, including less available farm land.  Job opportunities at the zone 
were limited, with for example only young people willing to work long hours at the casino 
accepted. The zone administration facilitated the movement of different groups into the zone. 
Chinese migrants moved in to run businesses such as hotels and restaurants. Migration 
networks, often associated with the home province of the site developer, enabled their access 
to the zone and the opportunities it presented. In addition, “the key engine that drives the 
economic force of the SEZ is the Burmese”, migrant workers from Myanmar who constituted a 
large portion of the workforce in 2012.130 Burmese migrants formed an informal, exploited and 
disposable workforce which was more pliable than a local Lao population somewhat resistant 
to the incursion of the zone into their livelihoods.131 The zone has depended on capital and 
state´s differential management of the mobility of populations.  The Golden Triangle thus has 
comprised a reterritorialization which has integrated Laos into the region. This 
reterritorialization has been implemented by powerful actors, to take advantage of uneven 
development and the possibilities for foreign capital that this presented. The reterritorialization 
has gained cohesion through the differential promotion of certain flows (capital, Chinese and 
Burmese migrants) and forms of social reproduction (zone wage labour over agricultural 
production). 
 The mobile configuration of SEZs in Laos and peripheral centrality in the reconfiguration 
of Southeast Asian production is also evident in the Savan-Seno SEZ in the southern province of 
Savannakhet. The Savan-Seno SEZ is located on the border with Thailand and also along the 
                                                          
129 Ian G. Baird and Bruce Shoemaker, “Unsettling Experiences: Internal Resettlement and International  
Aid Agencies in Laos,” Development and Change, 38, 5 (2007): 865-888. 
130 Pinkaew Laungaramsri, “Commodifying Sovereignty: Special Economic Zone and the Neoliberalization 
of the Lao Frontier”, 49-50. 
131 Pinkaew Laungaramsri, “Commodifying Sovereignty: Special Economic Zone and the Neoliberalization 
of the Lao Frontier”, 48-58. 
31 
 
EWEC. The zone was formally established in 2003 but its first factory did not open until 2011. It 
underwent a period of expansion over 2013-2014 when at least five new factories opened up. 
These factories were parts of the global supply chains of multinational firms, most of whom had 
existing production networks in Thailand. At the time of the author´s fieldwork in 2013-2014, 
the Savan-Seno factories served as an export platform, where materials and parts are imported 
from the production network in Thailand, taking advantage of the zone´s tariff waivers, 
assembled into components of goods such as cameras and cars, and then re-exported for final 
product manufacture in Thailand, or in one case potentially in Vietnam. Companies are thus able 
to cut costs on cheaper Lao labour and the zone´s tax exemptions, while benefiting from 
proximity to Thailand and its production networks.132 Mobile capital thus sought to enact a 
spatial fix which took advantage of the uneven development between Laos and its neighbours.  
 A look at the formation of the labour force indicates the deep connections between the 
regional Thai centre and its Lao periphery. Recruitment for an expanding zone was hindered by 
the high levels of labour migration from the province to Thailand. Official provincial statistics 
state that 35,607 migrants worked abroad in 2013,133 although other estimates put the figure 
much higher at 75,000.134 Either figure represents a significant proportion of a provincial labour 
market of around 500,000. Migration occurred at a higher rate from the more densely populated 
west of the province. The construction of infrastructure associated with the EWEC such as the 
Second Mekong International Bridge joining Savannakhet and Thailand, has facilitated 
migration.135 Migration networks have formed between western Savannakhet and the Bangkok 
Metropolitan Region with Lao going to work in construction, agriculture, manufacturing, 
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services and domestic work.136 Migration was often undocumented and clandestine, and it 
operated as a form of “geography from below”137 in distinction to formal state-led integration 
projects. Migration to Thailand would also alter local class relations in the Savan-Seno SEZ, with 
the tight labour market causing difficulties for firms´ recruitment.  
Labour mobility became a key area of contention and firm strategizing. A zone regulation 
was in place which prohibited workers from working at another zone factory for six months if 
they left employment, enacted in order to prevent poaching of workers.138 Recruitment was 
extended to the eastern areas of the province, inhabited by many from ethnic minorities, with 
a local recruitment agency bringing workers to Savannakhet and housing them in dormitories. 
The recruitment agency however experienced difficulties. At the point of recruitment, 
communities distrusted the recruiters due to being previously deceived by migration brokers, 
the situation hinting at histories of labour not freely chosen. Furthermore, ethnic minority 
workers reportedly evidenced the highest rates of turnover as many preferred to return to their 
home villages after being unable to adjust to life in far away factories.139 One local non-zone 
factory manager, also affected by the recruitment issues, raised the possibility of recruiting 
foreign labour.140 One factory worker reported filling out a resignation form, but managers 
refused to accept it and persuaded her to stay by saying her position was difficult to replace, 
indicating coercive elements within efforts to secure a workforce.141 The main strategy to secure 
workers however was increasing wages and benefits. Labour scarcity, as well as workers taking 
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advantage of this situation to press informal, collective demands on factories for wage raises or 
improved fringe benefits such as travel stipends, caused managers to respond with increases.142  
Workers were thus able to gain more of the generated value than might be expected. 
However, the gains should not be overstated as local factories appeared to also gain from 
workers´ ongoing embeddedness in subsistence agricultural production. Most workers were the 
daughters and sons of local farming families, living in their natal households which engaged in 
rice production and animal rearing. Part of the cost of their social reproduction was offset, 
meaning that factories escaped paying the full cost of this social reproduction and faced less 
pressure from workers to increase wages. A focus on the zone´s class relations thus shows that 
a linear notion of structural transformation does not appear to apply. Capitalist production was 
combined with, and seemingly to an extent dependent on, non-market oriented forms of 
production. The very combination however does have the practical effect of orienting more 
labour to capitalist production, albeit in an indirect way through the socially reproductive 
farming activities of zone workers´ households. 
 For the expansion of the zone it appeared that the management of mobility was key. 
The Lao state attempted to limit mobility by such means as working through village heads to 
explain the problems of migration and inform villagers of jobs at the local factories.143 Efforts 
were thus made to harness mobility and reterritorialize the Lao population. Some expansion of 
factories has taken place but there are indications that mobilizing enough labour is still a concern 
and a constraint on further expansion.144 The Savan-Seno SEZ was apparently enabled to an 
extent by the combination of the factory wage relation and workers´ subsistence production, 
and simultaneously constrained by the very unevenness – particularly wage differentials 
between Thailand and Laos – that investors sought to take advantage of. It thus seems that the 
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management of mobile class relations will continue to be a key factor in Laos´s regional 
integration and industrialization. 
Conclusion  
 It is certainly true that Laos has been on the periphery of Southeast Asia over the 
duration of capitalist development in the past 250 years. Nevertheless as I have shown control 
over its territory and its population has been a concern of, successively, Siamese kings, French 
colonialists, and contemporary foreign investors.  Indicated here is thus the need to adequately 
account for the peripheral constitution of Southeast Asia in explanations of regional dynamics.  
An appreciation of this history also indicates that to understand Laos´s current conjuncture, it 
behoves us to analyse the economic and geopolitical significance that Laos holds for capital and 
states in the region and their consequent attempts to create forms of integration which 
prioritize their own interests. Laos within China´s “Belt and Road” programme would be an 
especially instructive avenue of analysis here.145 Moreover, these emerging regional forms can 
be assessed for the ways that they may operate through differentially integrating populations, 
and so shed light on adverse incorporation and marginalization in mainland Southeast Asia´s 
political economy. The beneficiaries of specific forms of regional integration are of course not 
limited to foreign actors, as they have repeatedly operated through existing local hierarchies of 
power. It thus appears necessary to specify which Lao actors are most advantaged by the current 
forms of regional integration, in what ways, and to the disadvantage of whom. Labour 
incorporation illustrates this point.  Ensuring control over labour has been a key element in 
establishing successive, historical regional formations. Lao labour has over the centuries been 
incorporated into capitalist orbits in multiple forms and a glance for instance at contemporary 
tales of labour trafficking and bonded labour, alongside free wage labour, indicates elements of 
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continuity. Attention must therefore be paid to how the combination of foreign and local Lao 
actors attempt to control and deploy labour within Laos and also Lao labour beyond its borders. 
The exact modes of labour incorporation – free, bonded, disguised wage, and so on, as well as 
their potential combinations in the same sites – can be usefully specified within not only 
research programmes concerned with labour and migration, but also more broadly in analysis 
of contemporary development projects and processes. Foregrounding a specification of these 
modes, along with how workers of differentiated social identities are channelled into them and 
what labour conditions and remuneration are associated with them, provides a more accurate 
picture of the capitalist trajectories underway in Southeast Asia and the winners and losers 
therein. As the case of the Savan-Seno SEZ shows especially, the development of countries in 
mainland Southeast Asia does not progress in neat steps along a path of lower to higher value-
added activities but rather in complex combinations which integrate different forms of 
production and centres and peripheries in interdependent ways, often threaded together by the 
movement of workers across the region, to both their advantage and disadvantage.  
Mobility thus offers a useful vantage point in analyzing Laos and the region, and as 
demonstrated one that is deeply imbricated with labour deployment under capitalism. As noted 
by Molland, Vietnamese and Chinese labour migration to Laos appears to be a seriously 
understudied phenomenon worthy of analytical redress.146 The capitalist trajectory of Laos´s 
regional integration has been constituted – both enabled and disrupted - by the personal 
trajectories of innumerable workers across Southeast Asian space. They have provided one of 
the key sets of filaments which have created the “connected histories”147 of regional and global 
centres of accumulation and the Lao periphery, and furthermore indicate the need to analyse 
class relations as an integral part of centre-periphery connections.  
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